



Harmony Amidst Conflict

An Assessment of Guinea's Farmer-Herder Tensions and Local Approaches to Conflict Resolution

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Executive Summary

In the heart of Guinea, the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions exhibit both harmonious and discordant dynamics that are emblematic of the complex interplay of factors that can both bring cohesion and create fissures within a group. Environmental factors like climate change and biodiversity loss, customary practices that both convene and divide groups, and modern governance challenges can impact social cohesion. These issues are particularly pronounced with regards to the relationships between sedentary farmers and transhumant pastoralists. These regions in Guinea, characterized by their rich cultural diversity and significant economic activities centered around agriculture and pastoralism, face unique challenges that stem from their distinct socio-economic and ecological conditions.

Farmer-herder conflicts¹ are extremely localized events that are driven by the socio-economic circumstances and shared histories of the parties involved. However, these conflicts can be easily exacerbated or inflamed by exogenous factors like other conflicts, climate change, resource insecurity, human displacement, and politics. Trends around these types of inter- and intra-communal issues are complex and inconsistent, making them difficult to predict and mitigate.²

But historically, farmers and herders have been compatible neighbors, and these two socio-economic trade groups relied more heavily on each other as livelihoods were intrinsically linked around local subsistence economies. For example, pastoralists relied on leftover crop residue after the farming season, for their livestock to graze on, and livestock provided critical components of fertilizer for farmers ahead of their growing season.³ However, in more recent years, governments sought to grow and develop these two sectors - livestock rearing and agriculture production - industrializing the sector, and thus devaluing livelihoods of small scale farmers and herders and making them less interdependent on each other. While these shifts were taking place, though, in Guinea - which is a predominantly agrarian society with 62% of the population living in rural communes - most farmers and herders continued to engage in subsistence income generating activities (IGAs) that revolve around agro-pastoralism.⁴ Thus the pressures from industrialization are being felt at the local level, even though the communities have not benefited from this new market economy.

¹ For this study, the term 'conflict' is used generously, to refer to any negative engagement between two groups. Therefore, there is a spectrum of what we mean by conflict, which at the lower threshold can include disagreements and disputes between two groups, but can also include the higher threshold of 'conflict' which includes individual incidences of violence and property destruction, or communal and intra-regional clashes between warring parties.

² Richards, Simon. 2024. "Conflict in Pastoralist Areas of Sub-Saharan Africa." Tufts University, Feinstein International Center. <https://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/conflict-in-pastoralist-areas-of-sub-saharan-africa/>.

³ Pellerin, Mathieu, and Réseau Billital Maroobé (RBM). 2021. "Listening to Herders in West Africa and the Sahel: What future for pastoralism in the face of insecurity and its impacts?" Inter-réseaux. <https://www.inter-reseaux.org/wp-content/uploads/Edited-Report-Patoralism-and-Insecurity-in-the-Sahel-and-West-Africa-RBM.pdf.n>

⁴ USAID Land Tenure. n.d. "Guinea Property Rights and Resource Governance." https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/USAID_Land_Tenure_Guinea_Profile.pdf.

The modernization of these industries has also had the effect of reducing community reliance on traditional conflict resolution approaches particularly with regards to resource and land rights.⁵ In Guinea, 70% of local conflicts and tensions are linked to land disputes, which are generally the result of archaic land tenure policies and ownership that is grounded in customary frameworks that have not been codified into law.⁶ Population growth and changing land use patterns, practices, and policies, that do not fit within customary policies, continue to erupt into farmer-herder conflicts.

Despite these factors being present in Guinea, according to the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Guinea experiences low levels of farmer-herder violence compared to other countries in West Africa.⁷ This study corroborates findings by the UN, that the country's local peace committees are effective mechanisms in mediating and mitigating local level conflicts and disputes, and Guinea boasts a masterpiece of legal frameworks and processes that synergize customary conflict resolution processes with normative legal approaches, decentralized across the country. Significant NGO support to these committees has also helped in reducing local conflict.

The ethnic composition of Guinea is also a significant factor that has impacted both social cohesion and communal tensions. About 38% (nearly 4.9 million people) of Guinea's population is ethnic-Peulh, representing the only country where Peulh are the largest ethnic group, but not the majority.⁸ Guinea has faced several decades of political instability and inter-communal conflicts, particularly marked by ethnic tensions and struggles over resources. Since its independence in 1958, Guinea has faced a series of military coups, authoritarian rule, and political unrest that have often exacerbated ethnic divisions. The 1990s and early 2000s saw heightened violence, including clashes between different ethnic groups and widespread human rights abuses under successive regimes. This was exacerbated in the forested regions, which were severely affected by conflicts spilling over from neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone, leading to a complex humanitarian crisis and further ethnic strife within Guinea.

In response to these enduring challenges, Guinea adopted strategies early on to manage inter-communal tensions. Most of these strategies are an amalgamation of customary approaches to community dynamics — including conflict — that have been formalized and merged into what is becoming a nascent national framework for peace management and conflict resolution. These approaches are not novel concepts, and if anything are derivative of traditional and local coping mechanisms that are seen in communities across West Africa. The establishment of local peace committees, such as the 'Kèlèban Ton', reflects efforts to

⁵ Richards 2024

⁶ Kaba, Mariama. 2022. "États généraux du foncier en Guinée." Ministère de l'Agriculture. <https://www.agriculture.gov.gn/etats-generaux-du-foncier-en-guinee/>.

⁷ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit. 2018. "Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel." UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel. https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_pastoralisme_eng-april_2019_-_online.pdf.

⁸ Sangare, Bokare. 2019. "Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries." Observatoire du Monde Arabo-Musulman et du Sahel. <https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/201911.pdf>.

institutionalize traditional conflict resolution practices into mainstream national justice mechanisms. These mechanisms aim to promote dialogue and mediation at the grassroots level, drawing on the deep-rooted cultural practices of negotiation and reconciliation that have historically helped communities navigate periods of tension.

However, these localized approaches are not yet tested by the influence and overflow of exogenous factors that could destabilize the parts of Guinea that are regularly rocked by local violence. The growing threat of external pressures such as climate change, migration, and the potential spread of violent extremism, pose new challenges to these traditional and hybrid conflict resolution mechanisms, necessitating continuous adaptation and support from both national and international actors. While there is not yet sufficient evidence that the al-Qaeda aligned violent extremist organization (VEO), Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), is active in Guinea, the specter of violent extremism has already begun to create instability, as the local communities respond to concerns and fears of foreigners they believe are armed groups, further unraveling community cohesion.⁹

Nevertheless, compared to neighboring countries that are facing similar challenges, Guinea is in a unique position to leverage its existing tools and resiliencies, to decentralize governance and build a grassroots and sustainable approach to managing both local conflicts, and exogenous challenges.

⁹ Nsaibia, Héni. 2023. "Actor Profile: Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)." ACLED. <https://acleddata.com/2023/11/13/actor-profile-jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wal-muslimin-inim/>.

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
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Glossary

Term	Definition
CNRD	Comité National du Rassemblement et du Développement
CRIEF	Court of Repression of Economic and Financial Offences
CSO	Civil Society Organization
Customary	Referring to traditional practices
Donzo/Dozo	Traditional hunting brotherhoods, prevalent in Guinea, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso
Douti	Village Chief (elected) in Mandinke
EGF	General States of Land
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
Forest Region	N'Zérékoré Region of Guinea
Gnf	Guinean Franc (currency)
IGA	Income generating activity
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISP	Infrastructures Sociales de Paix
JNIM	Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin
Kèlèban Ton	Peace Committees
KII	Key Informant Interview
MUHAT	Ministry of Urban Planning, Housing and Territorial Development
Peulh	Fulani in French
Soti	Village Patriarch (not elected) in Mandinke
SyCAP	Synergie Communales des Acteurs de Paix
SyPAP	Synergie Préfectorale des Acteurs de Paix
SyRAP	Synergie Régionale des Acteurs de Paix
Transhumance	The seasonal practice of moving livestock between grazing areas
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNOWAS	UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding

Methodology

This research was initiated on behalf of USAID/West Africa's Strengthening Regional Peace and Stability (SRPS) program. The report contextualizes and synthesizes primary field research with existing literature and expert knowledge on farmer-herder and inter-communal dynamics in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions in Guinea. The study was designed and carried out by Elva Community Engagement and Talking Drum Studios (TDS)-Guinea. TDS researchers and enumerators carried out the field data collection and drafted the preliminary report of the primary research.



The study relied on a mixed methods approach that included a review of the existing academic and press literature, coupled with expert and key informant interviews and focus groups. The data collection took place across eleven settlements located in four prefectures, in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré Regions, from March-April 2024. Persons interviewed included farmers, herders, youth, women, local customary and political-administrative authorities and defense and security forces. In total, 102 key informant interviews (KII) and 12 focus group discussions (FGD) amounting to 68 participants, were conducted in Guinea. Disaggregated by gender, the research sample was 63% male and 36% female; women were harder to access due to their working hours and religious and cultural dynamics that made it more difficult for women to speak with the team alone. The research also included 10 expert interviews with civil society and local and traditional authorities, and government and security providers in Guinea.

Régions	Préfectures	Sous-préfecture/Localités
KANKAN	Kérouané	Mandina centre
		Sanankoroni
	Mandiana	Saladou
		Morodou
		Niantaninan
N'ZEREKORE	Beyla	Beyla centre
		Fonodou
		Gbèssoba
	Lola	Foumbadou
		Guéasso
		Lainè

The study faced several limitations due to the time in which it was commissioned. With religious holidays like Ramadan and Lent, research faced delays, unable to access certain groups. Additionally, the hottest season of the year occurs in March when the study began, so holding interviews during the middle of the day when it was hottest, was challenging. The research team was unaffected by the majority of the rainy season in April, but some roads were inaccessible when the rains began, causing travel delays. Additionally, the research coincided with the end of the planting and herding seasons, limiting certain samples, who were unavailable to participate as they were occupied by their livelihoods.

Introduction

Guinea has faced several decades of political instability and inter-communal conflicts, marked by ethnic tensions and resource competition. Since its independence in 1958, Guinea has experienced a series of military coups, authoritarian rule, and political unrest that have often exacerbated ethnic divisions, as leaders have exploited sectarian tensions at the communal level, to leverage their power grab in society. The 1990s and early 2000s saw high levels of violence, including clashes between different ethnic groups and widespread human rights abuses under successive regimes. The N'Zérékoré Region, in particular, was severely affected by conflicts spilling over from neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone, leading to a complex humanitarian crisis and further ethnic strife domestically, within Guinea.

The need for community-driven conflict management tools is deeply ingrained in Guinean society and finds its grassroots in the various internal conflicts the country has faced over the last 30 years. The prolonged periods of unrest and violence have underscored the importance of locally-rooted solutions that resonate with the cultural and social fabric of Guinean communities. Local leaders and communities have repeatedly turned to traditional mechanisms of dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation to manage and resolve conflicts, emphasizing the significance of these approaches in maintaining social order, but also the necessity of these tools in the absence of legitimate government resources to address local issues.

This report examines dynamics and drivers of socio-political and economic insecurity, by exploring the nuanced relationships between the farming and herding groups in Guinea, and mapping out the local and adopted responses formulated to address ongoing and emerging conflicts between them.

The governance structures in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions of Guinea, blend traditional authority with formal governmental systems, where local chiefs and religious leaders play pivotal roles in mediating conflicts and maintaining social order. Security issues, primarily driven by the transhumance of livestock through agricultural lands, present recurring challenges. As such, most farmer-herder conflicts remain unresolved and sometimes frozen until property damage or a dispute over access to resources reignites them. These issues are further complicated by the tensions that emerge between indigeneity claimants and their response to the arrival of external actors such as migrants and transhumant pastoralists from neighboring countries. Exogenous factors like the effects of climate change also exacerbate resource scarcity and heighten these intercommunal tensions, as farmers and herders compete for access to shrinking arable lands for both grazing and agriculture purposes.

Intercommunal dynamics in these areas are therefore marked by a delicate balance of conflict and cooperation, with pastoralism playing a critical role within the local economy, but also often serving as a source of contention. The governance of these dynamics is fraught with challenges, including the effective management of natural resources, implementation of policies, and the pervasive influence of corruption among government actors - particularly among police

and the justice system - which undermines equitable resource distribution and fair conflict resolution.

Amidst these challenges, local communities have demonstrated remarkable resilience and adaptability. Community-led initiatives aimed at peacebuilding and conflict prevention are pivotal, with significant emphasis on including women and youth to ensure inclusive and sustainable community development. Education and awareness programs further support these efforts, fostering a deeper understanding of sustainable practices and the benefits of maintaining peace.

This report culminates in a series of recommendations that underscore the importance of integrating traditional and modern governance approaches to address the multifaceted challenges threatening the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions. It highlights the critical role of external support in enhancing local capacities and stresses the necessity of fostering self-reliance and sustainability for long-term peace and stability. As these regions navigate the complexities of modernization and cultural preservation, their experiences offer valuable insights into the dynamics of rural governance and community resilience in sub-Saharan Africa.

Part 1: An Overview of the Socio-Economics of Agro-Pastoralism in Guinea

The socio-economies of certain communities, particularly rural ones, in Guinea, are often defined by traditional livelihoods and IGAs of the local population. Historically, IGAs transcended the workplace, and often defined inter- and intra-communal relationships, politics, and even cultural and religious identifiers of one's ethnic or communal group. This is particularly pronounced among the ethnic-Peulh, whose social strata were historically (and remains today in many ways) defined by their trade as livestock breeders and pastoralists.¹⁰ In the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions, farming and herding IGAs are the predominant livelihood, and as such these roles influence the socio-economic characteristics of communities that have worked in these trades for generations. Moreover, most people who participated in agro-pastoralism in these regions did so within the confines of their community and neighboring communes, thus not traveling far, and not interacting with other groups that work in trades other than farming and herding.¹¹ As such, for most of the people involved in this research study, the socio-economics of farming and herding, define every element of their lives, thus highlighting the importance and significance of both good and bad interactions between these two groups.

Narrowing in on the select regions of research, the topography of these regions helps explain how certain communities have adopted specific livelihood practices over time. The Kankan region is located in the savannahs of Guinea, where rice cultivation and livestock rearing thrive due to the prevalence of low grasslands and shrubs.¹² Gold mining is also prevalent in this space. The N'Zérékoré Region, meanwhile, is located in the Guinean forests — from where it derives its nickname “Forest Region” — where rice, palm oil, and coffee are cultivated.¹³ While the populations living in the Kankan Region have historically been quite familiar with both local and transhumant pastoralist practices, the N'Zérékoré Region's environment was historically an impoverished rural agrarian society. Throughout the 1990s-2000s, the forested regions of Guinea were rocked by intercommunal conflicts between the ethnic Guerzé and Konianké people, that damaged development of the mining and agriculture sector, resulting in over half of the population living below the poverty line.¹⁴ The clashes, which were driven largely by indigeneity claimants and disputes, have defined intercommunal trends in this region since (see more details in Part 2.1).¹⁵

¹⁰ Diallo, Mariama. 2022. “Les Contes à la Radio: Les Performances d'Amadou Sow.” Université Assane Seck-Ziguinchor.

[https://rivieresdusud.uzs.sn/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2033/diallo_memoire_2022%20\(2\).pdf?sequence=1](https://rivieresdusud.uzs.sn/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2033/diallo_memoire_2022%20(2).pdf?sequence=1)

¹¹ *The majority of respondents to the research carried out their trades only within the confines of their communities, further limiting their exposure to other potential livelihood opportunities, and as such, making cross-cultural integration unlikely.*

¹² Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2016

¹³ Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2016

¹⁴ Médam, Benjamin, and Beatrice Abouya. 2013. “Conflict Analysis Report Guinée Forestière.” Search For Common Ground and USAID. <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/situation-analysis-guinee-forestiere.pdf>.

¹⁵ Médam and Abouya 2013

Overall, livestock production contributes to 26.2% of Guinea's agricultural GDP.¹⁶ In light of this, the introduction of the pastoralism and land laws in the 1990s helped to codify certain competitive and economic rights for livestock breeders and ranchers by demarcating certain areas and embodying customary rules into national frameworks (see Part 3 for more details).¹⁷ As transhumance continues, there is a growing number of sedentary pastoralist communities in Guinea, particularly in the Futa Jallon, where due to the ruralness of this region that is also predominantly ethnic-Peulh, herders allow their livestock to roam freely. Nonetheless, the laws have helped to regulate these movements, and herders are now required by law to bring their livestock in at night and contain them in barns or enclosed areas.¹⁸

Box 1: Perceptions from the Data about Trade and Interactions with Foreigners

Only 21% of the research sample perceive that their community participates in regular commercial and cultural exchanges with groups — namely herders and merchants — from neighboring Mali or Côte d'Ivoire. However, this statistic is a reflection of a perception, and might not account for real commercial activity and contributions by non-Guineans to local trade or otherwise. Based on this working assumption, the data finds that men were more keenly aware of cross border trade, and the inputs of transhumant cattle from neighboring countries into cattle 'kraals', or markets, in Guinea. Meanwhile, women did not necessarily 'observe' these trade dynamics, so they were less aware of how much trade at the local level is supplemented or reliant on cross border movement of goods, which is thus reflected in the statistic itself.

Indeed, women interviewed for this research were particularly unaware of how products they purchase in markets might not be locally sourced, but rather are traded across borders, highlighting how insulated some of the communities believe they are from the regional and international supply chain across West Africa.¹⁹ But these dynamics are different by sub-prefecture: Nearly half of the respondents in Fombadou²⁰, Guéasso and Belya-center (Nzérékoré Region) were familiar with cross-border trade and the importance of cattle herded from Mali into their markets; whereas respondents in Madina-center, Morodou and Sanankoroni (Kankan Region) did not affirm any Sahelian cattle markets in their communes. In general, though, most of the research sample highlights the socio-economic interdependence that communities have with livestock breeders — due to milk and meat consumption, but also with regard to the seasonality of herders, by relying on herders to lend

¹⁶ Cofie Timpong-Jones, Eric, Igshaan Samuels, Felix Owusu Sarkwa, Kwame Oppong-Anane, and Ayodele Oluwakemi Majekodumni. 2023. "Transhumance pastoralism in West Africa – its importance, policies and challenges." *African Journal of Range & Forage Science*, 40(1), 114-128. https://repository.uwc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10566/8860/timpong-jones_transhumance%20pastoralism%20in%20west%20africa_2023.pdf.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

¹⁷ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

¹⁸ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

¹⁹ *Less than 20% of women interviewed understood that goods they purchase regularly are part of a larger transregional value chain of traded items.*

²⁰ *Fombadou is an important market town and trade center in the N'Zérékoré Region, driving commercial activity from across the sub-region, according to KIIs interviewed for the research.*

their cattle to help sow fields and consume crop residue to make space on farmland for new planting seasons.

Perceptions of these inter- and intra-communal trade and relations are important, but these trends can change, which can also affect how people perceive outsiders and engage with other groups. The effects of climate change and its impacts on shrinking green spaces have become significant drivers for movement, and socio-economic changes within certain communities. However, in response to this, efforts to modernize and create more efficiencies in agriculture and livestock production through cash crop farming and ranching cattle also have outsized impacts on the cultural and social frameworks of individual groups and communities.

This shifting dynamic is particularly pronounced among the Peulh pastoralists, a transregional ethnic group that is famously known for its transcontinental transhumant movement of livestock and migratory practices.²¹ The Fulani, or Peulh in French, are a majority ethnic group in Guinea, and largely dominate the livestock production trade.²² Their practices, for centuries, have become entrenched in cultural norms that have preserved the group's legacies and ancient practices, while borders and communities have shifted and lost touch with certain traditional ways of life. As such, their customs also have set the Peulh aside as an exclusionary group that shies away from multiculturalism, integration, and, to that end, the adoption of modern trades and livelihood practices.²³

Similarly, socio-economic tensions and shifting cultural trends have also exacerbated lifestyles of agrarian communities in Guinea, where modern agricultural practices appear to have sidelined subsistence farmers, creating more economic marginalization of groups that participate in traditional farming livelihoods. Guinea's government is looking to modernize the production of rice and other cash crops, including through a rice irrigation project in the Kankan Region, however the country's poor infrastructure has limited the implementation of these reforms.²⁴ The Mandinka are the second largest ethnic group in Guinea, and largely participate in farming, though other ethnic groups also participate in farming. Farmers who were interviewed for this research study explained that agriculture products are not selling at the same prices as last year due to the struggling economy within Guinea, but also globally. As a result, people are struggling economically, and this is exacerbating tensions with herders in particular, as access to water, fertilizer, seed and fuel becomes more restricted and more expensive.

²¹ PELA II. 2024. "Desk Study on Transhumance and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Coastal West Africa (CWA)." USAID West Africa. Peace Through Evaluation, Learning and Adaptation Activity II.

²² Cofie Timpong-Jones et al. 2023 and UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018


²³ Famine Early Warning Systems Network. 2016. "Guinea Livelihood Zones." FEWS NET. <https://fews.net/west-africa/guinea/livelihood-zone-map/october-2016-1>.

²⁴ U.S. International Trade Administration. 2024. "Guinea - Agriculture Sector." <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/guinea-agriculture-sector>.

1.1 Transhumance

Pastoralism, and therefore the livelihood discussed when talking about transhumance, is the fourth largest sector in Guinea's economy, though data about this trade is incomplete, as much of the activity still occurs in the 'informal sector'.²⁵ Agro-pastoralism is a critical livelihood for the majority of people in the Kankan and Nzérékoré regions, contributing significantly to the local economies through livestock breeding and trading. Markets in these areas attract traders from various regions, facilitating economic interactions but also introducing competition and potential for disputes.

Image 1: Transhumance Patterns between Mali, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, 2023

Transhumance, while a component of livestock production and breeding, is its own separate and distinct livelihood. Approximately 77% of livestock that originates in Mali is herded south annually, and Guinea receives 34% of that transhumant livestock supply every year (with Côte


²⁵ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

d'Ivoire receiving the majority), over the course of 60 days.²⁶ This amounts to approximately 21,885 animals arriving in the Kankan and Nzérékoré regions of Guinea annually.²⁷ An additional 14% of the 28,123 livestock that travel from Mali into Côte d'Ivoire, also end their journey in cattle markets in Guinea.²⁸ Only 8% of livestock that circulates through these transhumant corridors originates in Guinea.²⁹

While north to south transhumance is the dominant direction for this activity, Guinea also experiences highland to lowland transhumance along rivers, and internal to Guinea.³⁰ The difference is that internal transhumance occurs across 20-30 km distances within usually one location, whereas external transhumance is usually across borders and can be longer than 100km. And as mentioned above, this internal transhumance usually occurs in the Futa Jallon of Moyenne Guinée, wherein the Peulh dominate the social and economic dynamics, and have established a precedent for free range and localized herding.

Access to resources and freedom of movement for livestock are the biggest challenges that pastoralists face in Guinea. Blockages to transhumance routes occur frequently because the corridors for moving livestock are not clearly demarcated, and often rely on customary routes and arrangements with the local population that are not necessarily adhered to under current conditions. As such, farms and property lines are sometimes drawn over these routes, intersecting with traditional transhumance pathways, which then risks livestock trespassing on private property and causing property or crop destruction.

Image 2: Percentage of Respondents who experienced Farmer-Herder violence in 2023-2024



Source: Data collection

²⁶ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix. 2023. "Suivi des mouvements de transhumance (TTT) : Suivi des flux de transhumants - Frontière Côte d'Ivoire-Guinée - Tableau de bord #1, Collecte de données : Décembre 2022 - Mars 2023 | Publication : Juin 2023 - Côte d'Ivoire." IOM DTM.

<https://dtm.iom.int/fr/reports/cote-divoire-suivi-des-flux-de-transhumants-frontiere-cote-divoire-et-guinee-ttt-tableau-de>.

²⁷ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix 2023

²⁸ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix 2023

²⁹ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix 2023

³⁰ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

Furthermore, as more farmers switch from rainfed agriculture practices (traditional farming methods that rely on rainfall as a water source) to irrigated agriculture, they have moved their farms closer to water sources like riverbeds, which have traditionally been reserved as common grazing space for animals. When farms take over these arable lands, this reduces access to water points and grazing spaces for pastoralists.³¹ In Guinea, irrigated agriculture is not common, and when it is used, it's still largely seasonal, usually occurring during the dry season, as most farmers still rely on rainfall. However, this is also the same time of year that Sahel-based pastoralists arrive in Guinea. As such, tensions have piqued around water point access in recent years, as pastoralists trespass on farms in order to access these water points, causing damage to farms which can result in disputes or even violence (which will be discussed further in Part 2).

Effective governance in these regions is challenged by the need to manage and allocate natural resources equitably. This includes creating designated grazing routes that do not interfere with agricultural lands and ensuring that water sources are accessible to all groups. Although there are policies aimed at managing pastoralism and agriculture, implementation gaps exist (see Part 3). Local governments struggle with enforcement due to limited capacity and sometimes conflicting interests among different groups. However, allegations of corruption often undermine efforts to govern effectively. Indeed, the data collection even found reports of local authorities being influenced by bribes from wealthier pastoralists, which skews the fairness of resource allocation and dispute resolution. As one farmer explained, "*The corruption of the authorities... is often at the root of the discontent of the populations,*" highlighting how weak governance exacerbates conflicts and hampers effective management of pastoral and agricultural disputes.

The intricate relationship between intercommunal dynamics, pastoralism, and governance in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions reveals a complex tapestry of cooperation and conflict. Effective management of these relationships is crucial for the stability and economic prosperity of the regions, requiring a balanced approach that respects cultural practices while introducing sustainable innovations. The following sections will review the drivers of violence that disrupt local dynamics, as well as the existing instruments and local approaches to addressing these shocks.

1.2 Transhumance Routes in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré Regions

As this study particularly focuses on two regions - Kankan and N'Zérékoré - the data only reflects transhumance entry points from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire and Mali into these two regions of Guinea. The entry points are often referred to as 'gates' (in French, *pistes*). This section reviews the gates and markets in the Mandiana and Kérouané prefectures of the Kankan Region, and the Beyla and Lola prefectures of the N'Zérékoré Region (see Annex 1 for a full list of transhumance gates and markets, and the region specific maps below). These

³¹ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

routes are governed by the Prefecture Director of Agriculture and Herding (in French, *Direction Préfectorale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage*).³²

In all four prefectures, herders use both formal and informal entry points into Guinea. Due to a more robust border government initiated security deployment in recent months in response to the growing specter of violent extremism from Mali (and to a lesser extent from Côte d'Ivoire, the informal gates are being utilized more often, according to interviews with herders. This is in part because Malian pastoralists are facing indiscriminate targeting by police and other government officials at the border (like customs and immigration), due to the perceived notion that violent extremism will expand into Guinea through the Sahelian pastoralist communities who are typically ethnic-Peulh, and who have, in other contexts in West Africa, participated in VEO activity. Nonetheless, as will be elaborated on in section 2.2, key informants acknowledged that the security and government officials are tracking some of these unofficial entry points.

According to the government's records on transhumance, herders move along the Sankarani river, when herding their cattle to market towns throughout Guinea.³³ When herders pass through towns that are not major market centers, they often set up temporary camps on the outskirts that are equipped to accommodate both the herders and their livestock. In some cases, herders have pre-arranged agreements with local communities to use specific fields or spaces for grazing and resting during their journey; for example, in the Mandiana Prefecture (Kankan region), popular stopovers between gates, en route to cattle markets, were Kodiaran, Koundian, and Dialakoro, due to the resources available to herders there. These agreements between locals and transhumant pastoralists help in reducing conflicts and ensuring a smooth passage. Herders may also utilize communal grazing lands provided by the towns, which are often regulated to prevent overuse and ensure fair distribution among all users (see 3.1 for more details on Guinea's pastoral code).

Generally, herders are received by the local population with a mix of hospitality and caution. The local communities recognize the economic benefits brought by the herders through trade and cultural exchange. The presence of herders boosts the local economy as they purchase supplies and engage in various forms of trade. For example, herders typically purchase essential supplies such as food, tools, and sometimes veterinary products for their livestock. In return, herders sell dairy products like milk and cheese, meat, and crafts such as leather goods or traditional jewelry.


Many herders also have family or social connections in the towns along their routes. These connections are crucial for establishing temporary bases and obtaining support during the journey. Long-standing relationships with certain towns facilitate smoother interactions and cultural exchanges. These relationships often span generations, creating a sense of familiarity

³² République de Guinée. 2024. "Réponse à la Campagne de Transhumance 2024, du Madame de la Directrice Nationale des Alimentation et des productions Animales." Direction Préfectorale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, Region du Kankan, Préfecture de Mandiana.


³³ République de Guinée. 2024

and mutual respect. However, transhumance conflicts can arise over grazing rights, access to water, competition for resources, and property damage (see section 2.1 for more details).

Transhumance routes in the N'Zérékoré region



Transhumance routes in the Kankan region




Part 2: The Drivers of Insecurity in the Kankan and N’Zérékoré Regions

In the Kankan and N’Zérékoré regions in Guinea, the primary drivers of insecurity are the tensions that emerge at the intra- and inter- communal level. These tensions arise from a variety of factors, to include: disputes between farmers and herders; violent extremism; criminality, and the emergence of serious organized crime linked to a thriving illicit supply chain that is transregional; and the effects of over securitized and hardened approaches deployed by police and military. Finally, climate change and the effects of severe biodiversity loss have dramatically affected local livelihoods, and, as such, serve as a significant driver of insecurity that is cross-cutting with the aforementioned drivers in many ways, that is further discussed in Box 2.

According to the data collection, less than 30% of respondents reported that they feel unsafe in their communities, with only 3.7% percent of respondents indicating that they feel they are in danger regularly. A gendered assessment of these statistics further finds that 64% of men overwhelmingly enjoy feeling safe in their communities, even though only 36% of women reported feeling safe. It is possible that the perception of insecurity held predominantly by women in this sample highlights potential risks of domestic or gendered violence as well though. It is also possible, as seen in other research studies, that women who do not leave their communities as often as men do perceive more danger from exogenous threats, ostensibly fearing the ‘unknown’.³⁴ In this regard, women might believe that threats from armed groups and VEOs are prevalent, having heard of attacks in Mali. This perception of a ‘looming’ threat would skew the beliefs people hold about their personal security in these areas.

Image 3: Perceptions of personal security based on the Data Collection




Source: Data collection

³⁴ Other research conducted by Elva consistently finds that women report that there are insecurity drivers outside their communities, where they do not travel and do not have personal networks, like men do, reinforcing the fear of the ‘unknown’ as a significant indicator in what leads to perceptions of insecurity. (see also Bernard, Aneliese, and Dr. Aziz Mossi. 2023. “An Assessment of the Experiences and Vulnerabilities of Pastoralists and At-Risk Groups in the Atakora Department of Benin,” Analytical Report. Elva Community Engagement. <https://elva.org/case-studies/>.)

Nonetheless, insecurity has certainly increased in Guinea. According to the data collection, farmer-herder conflicts in Beyla-center, Fonodou, Laine, Foumabdou, Guesso, and Medina-center have reportedly increased in the past year. Although people reported that these incidents had increased, they also acknowledged that tensions with herders were quite common and as such, the local communities reported that these disputes were anticipated to occur during herding season. Yet, several respondents reported that tensions are higher than usual due to a confluence of factors. Farmers in Fonodou reported that they “*are permanently in conflict with breeders and their herds who devastate [their] fields*”, while pastoralists explained that the conflicts have emerged over land because “*landowners are at the root of all conflicts, because they rent the same land to farmers and breeders, forcing them to coexist on one small piece of property, and compete over land and resources.*”

2.1 Communal and Farmer-Herder Violence



Both conflict and social cohesion define inter- and intra-communal relations and dynamics in Guinea. While there are long histories and intersectional issues that affect these communal relations, for the context of this study, we look at the interdependent — and therefore often tense — relationships between farmers and herders. The impacts of pastoralism on local community dynamics are significant on the sedentary groups in communities that pastoralists move through. Although migration is not a new phenomenon, the introduction of new people that require access to local resources (e.g. water, grazing space, crop resin) can affect social cohesion, especially when competition over shrinking resources arises. As such, the movement

of livestock through agricultural areas remains a significant source of conflict in the communities that were looked at for this study, and respondents reported that farmer-herder tensions were at an all-time high.

When reviewing Guinea's communal conflicts, the research also addresses the long history of intercommunal tensions that have impacted these communities for generations. Identity politics - particularly with regards to questions of indigeneity - have been at the source of many community level clashes, which leads to distrust and perceptions of marginalization.³⁵ In the forested regions of Guinea, this generational tension is also tied to religious clashes between the Muslim communities and the much older animist groups that retain mystical ties to the land, and who view their cultivation of the land in the forested regions, as intrinsically linked to their identity and heritage.³⁶ This becomes further complicated by successive Guinean regimes' approaches to land laws since Independence, which often sided with those claiming their indigenous rights to the land.³⁷ While these dynamics are not unique to Guinea, the country's long history of communal issues, helps to frame the broader conflict issues that have emerged between farming and herding cultures.

Grievances around farmer-herder dynamics have quickly devolved into inter-communal conflicts in Guinea. As pastoralists move their herds in search of grazing lands, they often cross into farmlands due to poorly demarcated herding corridors or dried up grasslands in the corridors that force them to seek grazing space elsewhere. When livestock grazes in unapproved spaces, it can easily lead to destruction of property — specifically farmland and crops — which can ignite tensions between farmers and herders. Respondents to the research cited land access and property destruction, particularly by abandoned or lost animals, as one such instigator of tension. The back and forth property damage can sometimes escalate into reprisal violence against individual farmers and herders and their family, which can devolve into intercommunal violence, and as such, these communities remain armed and ready to quickly defend their group.³⁸ A focus group in Mandiana reported that, *"just a few months ago, the village chief was attacked and beaten in his field. We are inhabited by fear because we learn that people can come and attack us and kill us at any time, which is why we are always ready."*

Competition over resources and the encroachment of farmers into grazing corridors is also a significant source of conflict between farmers and herders. As these two groups are forced to share the same land for both farming and grazing, both parties need to practice more sustainable resource management that allows for livestock to be able to benefit from the same land that farmers are growing on, and vice versa. However, agriculture production consumes 90% of Guinea's water supply, leaving limited water resources available to pastoralists for their herds. Additionally, farmers commonly deploy slash-and-burn agriculture practices to destroy

³⁵ Médam and Abouya 2013

³⁶ Médam and Abouya 2013

³⁷ Médam and Abouya 2013

³⁸ Expert interview with civil society representative in Foubadou, Lola Prefecture, N'Zérékoré Region, May 2024

the crop residue, which limits the grass and leftover crops that herders are guaranteed access to for their livestock, under Guinea's pastoral laws (see Part 3).³⁹

The data collection found that relations have eroded significantly between farmers and herders in recent years. 43% of respondents reported that their communities had experienced farmer-herder conflicts in the past twelve months. The majority of these reports came from key informant interviews and focus group discussions in Madina-center (Kankan Region), Lainé and Foubadou (Lola Prefecture, N'Zérékoré Region). Respondents in Niantanina (Mandiana prefecture, Kankan Region), which reported that daily life had been stalled in many ways due to escalating violence between these groups. For example, a local representative from Madina-center explained that herders appear to operate with impunity when they arrive and destroy local property, even suggesting that herders pay bribes to law enforcement who allow them to operate undeterred. Additionally, several women reported being afraid of traveling alone to their farms, located on the outskirts of town, when herders were seasonally around, implying that sexual and gender-based violence is a risk. Although there is no explicit evidence to support these allegations, it characterizes the tense environment in Guinea between farmers and herders.

Respondents cited various types of violence occurring in these communities. This included conflict between farmers and breeders; land disputes within communities; violence linked to cattle rustling (which refers to cattle theft) and motorcycle theft; domestic violence; and in-country and cross-border property destruction. These localized disputes, however, can quickly devolve into cyclical reprisal responses between community members, which can escalate into communal level violence. When this occurs in borderland communities, it often escalates because the damages remain unresolved due to jurisdiction issues, and where the damages were done. This was recently the case between the communities of Bougoula (Mandiana Prefecture, Kankan Region), Guinea and the border town of Worodji in Mali, wherein intercommunal violence broke out between the two communities, but remains unresolved due to lack of jurisdiction by Malian authorities to address damages made by Guineans inside Mali. Often, the majority of these violent interactions are the result of the absence of clear demarcation of boundaries for herders, and property lines of farms. Moreover, as discussed in more detail in Part 3, confusion around existing legal frameworks, which may not resonate with customary agreements made between communities, can devolve into disputes that can escalate into violence. These conflicts become especially complicated when latent communal tensions that had never been resolved, and were frozen in time, are then renewed due to farmer-herder disputes that ignite them, as was seen in Lola in January 2023.⁴⁰

“In the event of a conflict between farmers and herders, it is the young people and women who bring the matter to the attention of the communal authorities for resolution. If this method fails, the wise men intervene by calling on the administrative authorities. If these first two approaches

³⁹ USAID Land Tenure, n.d.

⁴⁰ “Lola : Regain de tension entre éleveurs et agriculteurs... – Africa Guinée.” 2023. Africa Guinée. <https://www.africaguinee.com/lola-regain-de-tension-entre-eleveurs-et-agriculteurs/>.

fail, the young people start street demonstrations. When the conflict escalates, the army intervenes.” - traditional authority, Lola Prefecture, N’Zérékoré Region

Crop damage is generally the instigation for violence between groups, and was cited by all respondents as the primary driver of conflict. In border communities near Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, herders clashed with farmers after their livestock destroyed cassava farms, rendering small-scale farmers' livelihoods for the year obsolete.⁴¹ This is problematic for these border communities, because according to IOM, 95% of transhumant pastoralists that arrive in Guinea annually with their livestock are Malian, usually arriving into Guinea through Côte d'Ivoire. The larger cattle market towns receiving transhumant pastoralists are located in Daraguéréla, Gbessoba, Fonodue, and Koumandougou in the N’Zérékoré Region.⁴² But in general, the movement of these pastoralists through these border towns in Lola and Bayla prefectures, can be disruptive to local farming dynamics.

Integration is also a huge challenge in Guinea, causing social rifts; while most Malian pastoralists relocate temporarily, in the Beyla prefecture, recent indigeneity issues have emerged between the Malian Peulh pastoralists who have attempted to settle permanently in the N’Zérékoré Region, and the local non-Peulh population.⁴³ The Peulh have also been pulled into one side of latent conflicts between other ethnic groups regarding indigeneity claims in the forested regions, often taking the side of descendants of Liberian refugees, against the ‘native’ Guinean groups.⁴⁴ The N’Zérékoré Region’s farmer-herder clashes go beyond socio-economic disputes and also include conflicting belief systems and religions. While the people of the N’Zérékoré Region practice mostly animism and believe in mysticism and taboos aligned with their ecosystem, Peulh are predominantly Muslim. These issues underscore how difficult it is to create cohesion and understanding between two different cultures when tensions are high.

Box 2: Climate Change, Biodiversity Loss, and its Impacts on Local Conflicts

Due to climate change and biodiversity loss, coupled with spiraling conflict in the Sahel, the Kankan and N’Zérékoré regions have welcomed an influx of pastoralists from neighboring countries, who are often escaping insecurity or searching for better pastures for their livestock to graze on. This movement adds another layer of complexity to the local security dynamics, as it may introduce new groups into communities that might be unsettled by foreigners, which then increases competition over resources.

⁴¹ PELA II 2024

⁴² IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix 2023

⁴³ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

⁴⁴ Médam and Abouya 2013




Image 4: Seasonal Growing Calendar, Guinea, 2017

Source: FEWS NET, Guinea, 2017⁴⁵

Historically, climate patterns were somewhat predictable, which have allowed farmers and herders to anticipate their livelihood patterns, and, therefore, plan for the arrival and departure of pastoralists and their livestock from the Sahel. For example, in Guinea, the main harvest season traditionally took place from September to February, while land preparation, planting, and weeding occurred from March to September. However, in recent years, rainfall patterns have become less predictable, due to climate change. Rainy seasons are shorter, but much heavier than in previous years, causing damage when floods occur. This, in turn, impacts the growing season, and creates unpredictable patterns for pastoralists to rely on when practicing transhumance.

Changes in climate patterns and rainfall variations have intensified the scarcity of resources, such as water and grazing land, further complicating the transhumance dynamics. Moreover, droughts and desertification of the Sahara desert has at times led to increased movement of herders from the Sahel into Coastal West African states,⁴⁶ thereby exacerbating land and resource conflicts.⁴⁷ The data collection highlighted how changing climate patterns have led to the drying up of traditional grazing lands in the Moyenne Guinée and Haute Guinée regions, pushing herders to migrate to the more fertile forested regions in the south, thereby also exacerbating resource competition. These changing temperatures also inevitably impact populations of livestock, disease vectors, and vegetation patterns, which affect local IGAs as well.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Famine Early Warning System Network. 2017. "Guinea." FEWS NET. <https://fews.net/west-africa/guinea>.

⁴⁶ Throughout the 1970s-1980s, the Sahel experienced a record drought that resulted in 30% less rainfall than in previous decades. This led to tremendous climate induced migration of Sahelians into Coastal West Africa at the time. Many Peulh communities in these sub-Saharan countries today, that have sedentarized, trace their migration to the Coastal states back to this drought. (see also for more details on climate change induced droughts at Held, Isaac. n.d. "Sahel Drought: Understanding the Past and Projecting into the Future – Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory." Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory. <https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/sahel-drought/>.)

⁴⁷ Richards 2024

⁴⁸ Richards 2024

The initiatives for managing environmental impacts are crucial, as highlighted by efforts like reforestation and controlled grazing, which help mitigate the environmental degradation caused by intensive and sometimes corrosive agricultural and pastoral activities. For example, the movement of large herds through agricultural areas can lead to significant environmental degradation and crop damage due to grazing and is a frequent source of contention between herders and farmers. Additionally, as climate variability affects the availability of resources, pastoralists are also forced to alter their migration patterns. This adaptation means that pastoralists are being introduced into new areas where the local population is not familiar with the seasonal migration of herds, nor are they prepared to share resources with pastoralists.

These dynamics have become more prominent in the Kankan Region since the discovery of new gold mines. These mines draw in an influx of labor migrants from across West Africa, which further disrupts community cohesion and further strains existing resource availability, like fresh water. Moreover, gold mining has direct ramifications on biodiversity loss and corrosive impacts on the land (including through cutting down trees and destroying arable farming and grazing land). The presence of miners has exacerbated intercommunal violence in the Mandiana prefecture in the Kankan Region since 2021, when mining began there.⁴⁹

2.2 Security Force Capacity and Community Relations

The literature highlights how when security forces get involved in farmer-herder conflicts, the violence escalates and casualties or damages increase.⁵⁰ As a result, although most people expressed their support for security force involvement in intercommunal issues, these interventions can be undermined by mistrust or perceptions of the police deploying ethnic and social biases in favor of one group when handling these conflicts, especially because ethnocentric politics have historically hampered Guinea's security force's capacity to operate fairly, and brought into question their legitimacy.⁵¹ In general, though, respondents reported that the presence and efforts of local police and gendarmerie in attempting to maintain peace and order was welcomed, even if these efforts are sometimes seen as insufficient by the communities due to limited resources and allegations of partiality. However, non-state armed groups like self-defense militias, are popular as well, particularly when formal security is not present or when one party to the conflict is unable to elicit formal means for security.

⁴⁹ Crisis 24. 2021. "Guinea: Additional violence possible after clashes in Mandiana, Kankan Region, Aug. 31." <https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2021/08/guinea-additional-violence-possible-after-clashes-in-mandiana-kankan-region-aug-31>.

⁵⁰ *It is possible that the correlation of escalating violence following security force involvement is linked to the fact that the security forces only engage when the conflict has already escalated into uncontrollable violence.* (Richards 2024)

⁵¹ *The 2009 Conakry stadium massacre shed light on the indiscriminate targeting of ethnic-Peulh by state security. This was further reinforced by the ethnic-Malinke support for former President Conde, in opposition of ethnic-Peulh candidates, who faced extreme political violence by the security forces.* See also: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 2014. "Guinea: Ethnic composition of police and military forces; treatment of Peul by authorities, including police and military, and in cases where a Peul individual requires state protection; information on Camp Makambo, including location and purpose 2009-May." GIN104870.E. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/537db96b4.html>.

Table 1: Perceptions of who provides security

	Women	Men	Both
Gendarmerie	73%	72.3%	72.5%
Police	59.5%	64.6%	62.7%
Military	48.6%	55.4%	52.9%
Traditional Hunters	54.1%	44.6%	48%
Traditional leaders	43.2%	29.2%	34.3%
Local Self Defense Militias	16.2%	10.8%	12.7%
Non-State Armed Groups (non-local)	0%	1.5%	1%
VEOs	0%	0%	0%
Other	13.5%	15.4%	14.7%

Source: Data collection

In general, views of security forces were quite positive, but the research sample found mixed reviews of security force capacity to aptly and capably reduce violence and protect communities. Security officers who were interviewed also acknowledged the limited capacity of Guinean military and police to respond to threats, particularly when threats or violence occurred near the border, far from the capital.⁵² In general, each commune has two assigned police officers and two assigned gendarmeries, highlighting the limited official security presence. As such, these authorities are forced to collaborate with customary militias and self-defense groups in order to capably repel threats, while police are there to ensure law and order is maintained. As the president of the Sanankoroni Dozo (a traditional hunting brotherhood that sometimes operates as a self-defense militia) explained, “the police don’t have enough men or resources to protect the people, so we do the protecting.”

Box 3: Perceptions of the Current Regime

In September 2021, a military junta led by General Mamady Doumbouya and his new party, the National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (or in French, the Comité National du Rassemblement et du Développement, CNRD), overthrew longtime President Alpha Condé, under the pretext of liberating the country from a corrupt regime and autocratic overreach. The Doumbouya regime has initiated anti-corruption efforts as part of its platform during the transition that began in October 2021, which has manifested in practice through the establishment of the Court of Repression of Economic and Financial Offences (CRIEF) in December 2021. However, addressing corruption under the junta has not been quite straightforward, and the CNRD has instead narrowed its efforts to ostracizing political opposition by arresting former government officials and implementing a politicized crackdown

⁵² Expert interviews with several security providers, Kankan and N’Zérékoré Region, May 2024

on the mining sector.⁵³ Meanwhile, impunity for political and business elites continues, while the judicial system is hindered by resource constraints and ethnic bias, and while reports of extrajudicial killings, torture, and indiscriminate detentions are growing.⁵⁴

Doumbouya's government is currently facing a slew of international sanctions aimed at pressuring leadership to transition back to democratic rule. Meanwhile, despite anti-corruption efforts, politics remains volatile in Guinea, and the country's economic struggles remain pervasive, while elites continue to exploit poverty and corruption, benefiting from drug and trafficking cartel activity.

The CNRD has also appointed its third prime minister in just three years, highlighting the government's current political limitations, and mounting public disillusionment towards a military-led government that appears to sideline ethnic and sectarian groups in Guinea.⁵⁵ The restriction of civic and media spaces in the past year and repression of political opposition and demonstrations is fomenting more frustration within civil society, as seen through labor strikes in February 2024. As a civil society leader in Lola explained, *"the current ruling party and their security actors are a brutal force of repression in support of those in power."*⁵⁶

Several civil society representatives reported that security has decreased since the CNRD came to power.⁵⁷ Many reported that despite anti-corruption campaigns, security providers are still engaged in extortion mechanisms, and benefit greatly from the organized crime that has continued largely uninterrupted under the current government. Allegations that road checkpoints have decreased highlight how the junta has likely consolidated security closer to the capital to potentially avoid a counter-coup, following several rumored attempts.⁵⁸ However, some respondents reported that security has increased, and roadside banditry has lessened.⁵⁹ The diverging views on the CNRD highlight the political schism at the local level.

2.3 Crime

There are reports of increased criminal activities in the regions, and 70% of the research sample said that crime linked to banditry, theft, and highway robbery had become increasingly problematic in the past year. As one local official explained, *"in Kankan, robberies by armed gangs are a regular occurrence, mostly occurring in broad daylight, showing how these gangs operate with impunity."*⁶⁰ Expert interviews with security providers in the N'Zérékoré and Kankan regions highlighted that the presence of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and armed robbery around mining areas, specifically Siguiri and Kankan, have prioritized the government's

⁵³ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, n.d.

⁵⁴ Amnesty International. 2021. "Guinea: Coup leaders must protect the rights of all population." <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/guinea-coup-leaders-must-protect-the-rights-of-all-population/>.

⁵⁵ Ouedraogo, Lassane. 2024. "Guinea's Post-Coup Politics Put Doumbouya in the Hot Seat | WPR." World Politics Review. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/guinea-coup-politics-doumbouya/>.

⁵⁶ Expert interview with civil society leader, Lola Prefecture, N'Zérékoré Region, Guinea, May 2024

⁵⁷ Expert interview with Traditional authority, Lola Prefecture, N'Zérékoré Region, May 2024

⁵⁸ Expert interview with local NGO, Beyla Prefecture, N'Zérékoré Region, May 2024

⁵⁹ Expert interview with community leader, N'Zérékoré Region, May 2024

⁶⁰ Expert interview with administrative official, Kankan Region, May 2023

strategic concerns for the time being. As such, the government has responded with more special forces deployments to the borderlands, which the local population have interpreted as evidence of the presence of armed actors inside Guinea.⁶¹ These activities are often linked to the lack of adequate policing and the rugged, porous nature of the borders, which are difficult to monitor and control. However, the majority of respondents said that the increased presence of security in the past year has made communities feel safer, even though others report that crime has increased. Most people further highlighted that crime reduction has emerged due to collaborative efforts between security forces and traditional militias, namely the Dozo.

“In our village, thanks to the work well done by the security agents, the Donzos, and the women, we sleep well without any worries. Currently, we no longer hear the theft of telephones, nor motorcycles, and even cattle at my level”

- Youth Leader from Saladou.

Interestingly, as security has increased in the borderlands to patrol for armed activity, this has pushed people who cross the border frequently to avoid checkpoints. Herders interviewed for the research admitted that in recent years, they have begun to increasingly use unapproved and diverted routes and crossing points through the bush, instead of the approved routes, to avoid the interrogation by security forces, and lengthy delays they face at border crossings now. However, most respondents said that the authorities are aware of these crossing points. Nonetheless, the frequency with which people cross borders and move irregularly has contributed to a thriving illicit supply chain through Guinea. Almost 40% of the research sample acknowledge their familiarity with illicit trafficking of both regular (livestock, fertilizer, consumable goods, and fuel) and illicit goods (human trafficking, organ trafficking, illegal medicines, and narcotics). Respondents reported that merchants, bandits, and taxi drivers are likely involved in most trafficking syndications.


As a result, the current government in Guinea has particularly focused on clamping down on illicit medicine trafficking.⁶² However, Guinea is still a source, transit, and destination country for human trafficking in humans, arms, and counterfeit goods. It is a minor transit country in trafficking of narcotics like heroin, and the synthetic drug production and trade is pervasive, due to weak and corrupt law enforcement and the systemic role of political elites in drug trafficking.⁶³

⁶¹ Expert interviews with local authority and administrative official in Kankan Region, May 2023

⁶² Kane, Mouhamadou. 2023. “Guinea’s junta takes a hard line against illicit medicine.” ISS Africa. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/guineas-junta-takes-a-hard-line-against-illicit-medicine>.

⁶³ Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. n.d. “Criminality in Guinea.” The Organized Crime Index. <https://ocindex.net/country/guinea>.

2.4 Violent Extremism



This sub-section reviews the prospective and looming threat of a VEO insurgency in Guinea, given the proximity of recent JNIM violence on Mali's southern border with the Kankan Region in particular. The question of the propensity for pastoralists to join VEOs from the Sahel is of growing concern in policy circles in countries that receive annual transhumance migration. In the Sahel, the literature has posited many theories as to why specifically ethnic-Peulh pastoralists might join an armed group. Among these assessments, is that as government policies towards land rights often favor farming and sedentary groups, pastoralists are increasingly socio-economically, and therefore politically, marginalized.⁶⁴ The grievances that emerge from this kind of marginalization have been seen as compelling pull factors towards violent extremism.

The Guinean government is increasingly focused on violent extremist threats from neighboring Mali, and to a lesser extent, northeastern Côte d'Ivoire.⁶⁵ Since 2023, there has been growing speculation that JNIM had reestablished a rear-base⁶⁶ in the Folon region of Côte d'Ivoire, in the

⁶⁴ Benjaminsen, Tor A., and Boubacar Ba. 2024. "A moral economy of pastoralists? Understanding the 'jihadist' insurgency in Mali." *Political Geography* 113. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2024.103149>. See also Bernard and Mossi 2023

⁶⁵ Expert interviews with several local and administrative authorities, as well as security officials in Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions, May 2024

⁶⁶ A rear-base is the remote-located base that typically hosts logistics reinforcements for an army or militia, to support units on the frontline.

tri-border space between Mali, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, following its retreat from this region after the Ivorian government deployed a counterterrorism mission to its north in 2021.⁶⁷

Suspicious of JNIM's presence in this tri-border space were reinforced when in March 2024, JNIM conducted several attacks along the Guinean border, south of Mali's capital, Bamako, highlighting the group's expansion beyond its typical areas of operation north of Sikasso, Mali.⁶⁸ Two attacks on Guinea's border resulted in Malian armed forces fleeing their position, allowing the combatants to loot the base resources. This incident was a strategic success for JNIM, marking their capacity to expand into Guinea with significant resources in tow, and few obstacles in their way. The group's capacity to sustain clashes with security forces south of Bamako further indicates the possibility that JNIM has established a rear base or support zone nearby.⁶⁹ According to security officials that were interviewed in an expert capacity for this study, following attacks in both Kourémala and Koulé, Mali, Guinean officials determined that JNIM indeed has supply lines that run through the Kankan Region, and that VEO recruitment among local youth is underway. Local officials were particularly worried about recruitment by VEOs among those who are in the political opposition or disillusioned with the current ruling regimes approach.⁷⁰

Existing research about perceptions of violent extremism in Guinea shows high literacy at the local level of the drivers and push and pull factors of local recruitment.⁷¹ However, only 30% of this research sample was concerned that local dynamics could be leveraged as entry points for recruitment by armed groups inside Guinea.⁷² Many people reported concerns about transhumant pastoralists from Côte d'Ivoire and Mali importing violent extremism into Guinea. As one breeder from Niantanina said, *"We border with Mali where they are already causing a lot of damage. These jihadists have no mercy. They can take advantage of conflicts and disagreements between populations to commit irreparable acts."* Nonetheless, evidence of a JNIM insurgency inside Guinea is still not completely apparent, as it is in other countries in Coastal West Africa, like Benin.⁷³ For example, although the country's social fabric is weakened by intercommunal issues, Guinea's Peulh population, a typically at-risk group in the Sahel, is much more politically integrated in Guinea than in other countries, making them potentially less susceptible to VEO radicalization.⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Expert interview with security force provider, N'Zérékoré region, May 2024

⁶⁸ Karr, Liam. 2024. "JNIM Encroaches on Guinea; al Shabaab Hotel Attack." Institute for the Study of War. <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/jnim-encroaches-guinea-al-shabaab-hotel-attack>.

⁶⁹ Karr 2024

⁷⁰ Expert interview with security provider, N'Zérékoré Region, May 2024


⁷¹ Barry, Mamadou. 2018. "Étude de Perceptions sur la Problématique de la Prévention de l'Extrémisme Violent en Guinée." Search for Common Ground. https://documents.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/%C3%89tude-de-base-GUI507_Unis-dans-nos-diff%C3%A9rences.pdf.

⁷² *Fewer women than men were concerned about the risks of violent extremism penetrating Guinea, through local conflicts. This is likely because women remain closer to home, and engage less with external actors who might present threats in person, or share stories about VEO activity in the Sahel.*

⁷³ Bernard and Mossi 2023

⁷⁴ Sangare 2019

Image 5 : By location, reports of suspicious foreigners



Source: Data collection

Local officials and respondents pointed to increased banditry and organized theft schemes as indicators that VEOs were present, and half of the research sample reported observing an increased presence of ‘foreigners’ in marketplaces in the past year, citing linkages to violent extremists. Some literature suggests that in frontline communities, banditry can sometimes be a precursor to VEO activities, as bandits will loot and steal goods to supply resources to VEOs.⁷⁵ However, recent assessments of JNIM’s expansion strategy into Coastal West Africa, shows that the group typically avoids mistreating the local population in order to gain support.⁷⁶ However, the presence of religious fundamentalists⁷⁷ in the Kankan Region and the growing reports of armed robberies have led local security to warn about JNIM infiltration. To add to this, several experts reported that JNIM facilitators crossed the border into Mandiana, Siguiri, and in other villages on the border with Mali in the Kankan Region, to supply the VEO with resources.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Barnett, James, Murtala A. Rufa, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. 2022. “Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a “Banditization” of Jihad? – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/northwestern-nigeria-a-jihadization-of-banditry-or-a-banditization-of-jihad/>.

⁷⁶ Other unpublished research conducted on JNIM’s expansion into Ghana by Elva, highlights how JNIM has avoided targeting Ghanaians, in an attempt to curry favor locally, possibly in advance of a long term insurgency. It’s more likely therefore that JNIM will pursue this approach instead of attacking the population for now, as this strategy has found more marked success for the group as they expand into Coastal West Africa.

⁷⁷ A growing number of Salafi Muslims in Guinea since the 1990s have fomented tensions and distrust with traditional Muslim leaders who are Tidjaniya followers, a Sufi brotherhood. These tensions have recently resulted in allegations that the Salafists are importing violent extremism, despite there being no evidence of this. The importation of foreign Islamic teachings continues to be a space where government officials look for potential VEO threats across West Africa, but which there remains little evidence of. See Basse, Yssa O. 2019. “« Unis dans nos différences ! Promouvoir la coexistence pacifique en Guinée » Rapport de L'Évaluation À Mi-Parcours Prése.” Search for Common Ground.

https://documents.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Search-Guinea_UE_Unis-dans-nos-Diff%C3%A9rence-Rapport-final-%C3%89valuation-%C3%A0-mi-parcours.pdf.

⁷⁸ Expert interviews with local authority and administrative official in Kankan Region, May 2023

Part 3: Guinea's Complex Governance and Peace Architecture

Governance refers to the exercise of political and administrative authority within a community, region, or country, according to the United Nations (UN).⁷⁹ The UN further specifies that governance is a term that is commonly used to describe the 'mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.'⁸⁰ In this context, and with regards to the research, governance structures also refer to the institutions that exist to represent farmers and herders, and their equities and interests, in an inclusive manner at the local level. At the community level, 'governance' concerns the means undertaken by the actors of a community in order to promote their common interest. Common interests obviously vary from case to case, but it often relates to the exercise of influence over public policy decisions, capacity for action and community development (socially, economically and politically).

The structuring of community governance amounts to determining the composition and role of each actor within this crucible. However, across West Africa, and indeed in the particular research areas of this study in Guinea, governance is weak; as a result, there is little capacity at the local, let alone national level to diffuse and manage tensions between groups when they arise.⁸¹ Nonetheless, the Guinean government is currently in the process of synergizing the various communal peace networks and processes that are described in more detail below, across the country, under one national architecture of peace actors led by the Ministry of Citizenship and National Unity. This section reviews the existing governance structures in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions.

3.1 Guinea's Legal Framework on Pastoralism and Land Rights

Guinea's national legal body includes pastoral and agricultural codes that are part of the country's constitutional framework on both environmental sustainability and land and property rights. Legislation with regards to management of natural resources is enforced by many sectors in Guinea, including by ministries and offices that govern land, forests, water, and minerals, and, as such, many of these decrees and protocols are contradictory or inconsistent with each other.⁸² As a result, the laws fall short of being able to ensure that provisions and regulations are clearly adjusted in accordance with whatever ministry or sub-office is in charge of addressing specific issues. Additionally, whatever law enforcement body is tasked with enforcing these regulations, often fails to adjudicate misuse of resources properly, given the

⁷⁹ UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. 2012. "Governance and development - Thematic Think Piece UNDESA, UNDP, UNESCO." United Nations. https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20Pieces/7_governance.pdf.

⁸⁰ UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda 2012, *ibid*.

⁸¹ Pellerin, Mathieu, and Réseau Billital Marobé (RBM). 2021. "Listening to Herders in West Africa and the Sahel: What future for pastoralism in the face of insecurity and its impacts?" Inter-réseaux. <https://www.inter-reseaux.org/wp-content/uploads/Edited-Report-Patoralism-and-Insecurity-in-the-Sahel-and-West-Africa-RBM.pdf>.

⁸² USAID Land Tenure, n.d.

inconsistencies in these legal frameworks and overlapping mandates of ministries that govern them. These legal protocols and codes become even more confusing, as there are attempts to integrate these principals with older customary practices that communities typically adhere to, which is further complicated by the fact that there are clear gaps in where laws stop short of connecting with customary rights.

The Rural Land Policy (*Déclaration de la Politique Foncière en Milieu Rural*) was established in 2001 to address the shortcomings of the 1992 Guinea Land Code (*Code Foncier et Domaniale*) and to formalize customary rights into law and decentralize rural land management to local governments (known as *collectivités locales*). However, the 2001 policy nonetheless failed to effectively synergize the customary and national policies, which has led to tensions at the local level, as the majority of land claims in Guinea remain unregistered with the government, and instead are upheld only by customary laws, making these claims vulnerable to state transfer or privatization.⁸³ The Rural Land Policy initially proposed to first take inventory of existing land rights claims, in order to protect rural and marginalized communities' customary land claims.⁸⁴ Yet despite these intentions, the implementation of these regulations has faced challenges, and remains largely unimplemented today.⁸⁵

This highlights the complexity and challenges associated with land reform policies, and recognizing land rights in contexts where customary practices prevail. Nonetheless, recently, the Collective of Civil Society Organizations for the Defense of Community Rights (CODEC) published proposals with the objective of guiding legislators in drafting a land law that would encompass the inclusive participation of all stakeholders, particularly local ones. Additionally, in 2022, with support from the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Guinea set out to analyze the land situation and propose solutions in lockstep with FAO guidelines globally about land tenure policies.⁸⁶ The FAO launched its land tenure program alongside the Ministry of Urban Housing and Land Development.⁸⁷ However, it is important to note that, despite these efforts, previous projects aimed at developing rural land plans have not been pursued due to political instability in Guinea. Indeed, it seems that although progress has been made, the full implementation of the Rural Land Plan and the securing of customary land rights remains a challenge.⁸⁸⁸⁹

⁸³ USAID Land Tenure, n.d.

⁸⁴Touré, Oussouby. 2004. "The impact of pastoral legislation on equitable and sustainable natural resource management in Guinea." International Institute for Environment and Development, no. 126 (March). <https://www.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/migrate/9323IIED.pdf>.

⁸⁵ Republic of Guinea. 2001. "République du Guinea, Décret D/2001/037/PRG/SGG Portant Adoption de la Politique Foncière en Milieu Rural." FAOLEX. <https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/gui150951.pdf>.

⁸⁶ UN Guinea. 2022. "General States of Land: A historic forum in Guinea." United Nations. <https://guinee.un.org/fr/218020-etats-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9raux-du-foncier-un-forum-historique-en-guin%C3%A9e>.

⁸⁷ UN Guinea 2022

⁸⁸ Foncier & Développement. 2023. "Tenue des États généraux du foncier (EGF) en Guinée." Foncier & Développement. <https://www.foncier-developpement.fr/actualite/tenue-des-etats-generaux-du-foncier-egf-en-guinee/>.

⁸⁹ Foncier & Développement. n.d. "Guinée." <https://www.foncier-developpement.fr/pays/afrique-de-louest/guinee-2/>.

The Pastoral Rights Law of 1995 (in French, known as *Loi du 29 Août 1995 Portant Code Pastoral*), guarantees herders access to grazing and pastoral areas, while also setting limits on overgrazing and overuse. Like the Rural Land Policy, the pastoral code establishes that all laws on pastoralism operate with respect to ‘customary rights of other users’ to ensure security of herders and integration of pastoralism with agriculture practices, highlighting the traditional web of protocols that govern these livelihoods and lived experiences.⁹⁰

The pastoral code specifically regulates how natural resources are used and managed in livestock rearing, preserves rights of land and resource use for pastoralists, and sets standards for resolving conflicts between farmers and herders. The code guarantees pastoralists with grazing rights and access to harvested fields and natural resources like water. Local authorities are also given the power to leverage the pastoral code to establish common grazing zones, and set user-taxes on these areas as well. The pastoral code also identifies and demarcates grazing spaces during the rainy season; regulates crop residue⁹¹ use; sets conditions for accessing pastoral zones; imposes temporal restrictions on free-grazing of livestock; sets rules regarding water use and access; and establishes rules and timelines for fire setting to grazing and farming lands.

Despite the intricate rules embedded in the pastoral code, it had been ineffective for years.⁹² However, in November 2022, the Ministries of Agriculture and Urban Planning, Housing and Territorial Development (MUHAT) launched the General States of Land (Etats Généraux du Foncier in french EGF) process to establish a new pastoral code and land reforms, with support from the FAO.⁹³ Under the EGF and the Presidency, Guinea enacted **the new Pastoral Law L2024/008/CNT on 25 May 2024** to revitalize the livestock industry by providing a robust legal framework that not only fosters development and well-being for pastoralists and livestock breeders, but also ensures sustainable management of natural resources.⁹⁵ The promulgation of the new pastoral code should mark a significant milestone in Guinea’s agricultural policy, if enforced, reflecting a progressive step towards modernizing the livestock sector while addressing the socio-economic needs of small-scale farmers as well.

The new pastoral law's focus on collaborative resource management is particularly noteworthy, as it encourages a synergistic approach to the utilization of natural resources which is essential for the long-term sustainability of both the environment and the agro-pastoral sector. By establishing clear guidelines for various farming practices — that includes both traditional practices, as well as modern approaches — the law ensures that all forms of livestock breeding, ranching, and farming are catered to, promoting inclusivity and diversity within the

⁹⁰ Touré 2004

⁹¹ *Crop residue, also known as stubble or trash, is the plant material left in a field after a crop has been harvested. It can include stalks, stems, leaves, and seed pods.*

⁹² Interview with NGO expert, May 2024

⁹³ Kaba 2022

⁹⁴ UN Guinea. 2022. “Etats Généraux du Foncier: Un forum historique en Guinée.” Les Nations Unies en Guinée. <https://guinee.un.org/fr/218020-etats-g%C3%A9n%C3%A9raux-du-foncier-un-forum-historique-en-guin%C3%A9e>.

⁹⁵ Diallo, Mamadou Y. 2024. “Élevage : le CNT adopte du nouveau Code pastoral.” Guineematin.com. https://guineematin.com/2024/02/07/elevage-le-cnt-adopte-un-nouveau-code-pastoral/#google_vignette.

sector.⁹⁶ The legislation's emphasis on the rights of pastoralists and their integration into the broader agricultural framework is a commendable effort to harmonize the relationship between livestock farming and agriculture.

How the law sets out rules about grazing and farming land delineations are crucial in regions where conflicts between farmers and breeders have historically impeded economic growth. By delineating pastoral usage rights and environmental preservation duties, the law not only protects the interests of breeders but also aligns them with Guinea's national goals towards better environmental conservation. The integration of livestock farming with agriculture is also quite a strategic move that could lead to a more holistic approach to land use, potentially reducing conflicts and fostering a more cooperative environment for all parties involved. This aspect of the law could also help pave the way for innovative farming techniques that benefit both agriculture and livestock production, ultimately contributing to food security and economic stability.

In essence, the pastoral code is a forward-thinking piece of legislation that has the potential to catalyze positive change within Guinea's agricultural sector. It represents a balanced approach to development, one that considers the needs of small-scale farmers, the imperatives of modernization, and the overarching goal of sustainable resource management. If implemented effectively, this law could serve as a model for other nations seeking to modernize their agricultural sectors while preserving the livelihoods of their rural communities.⁹⁷

However, if the new pastoral code fails to be synergized with customary practices, it might not be as effective as it is being hailed to be. **Customary Land Tenure Structures** often commit to concepts of land and resources being inalienable rights. As such, most customary land rights policies in Guinea secure access to land based on social identity and kin-group membership. Since one family or group will have ownership to land for generations, there are important customary practices embedded in land tenure that encourage different use-rights to be granted for the same plot of land.⁹⁸

Guinea has many different customary practices to manage resources and community access to resources. For example, in Haute (Upper) and Moyenne (Middle) Guinea, the 'tongo' system for common property use and sustainable biodiversity use practices is applied, whereby certain flora and fauna are protected during germination, leaning on traditional approaches to conservation. The Peulh, particularly those in the Moyenne Guinea have traditionally relied exclusively on negotiations over landholdings through customary practices and authorities; however, the recent expansion of ranching and cash crop farming has begun to put pressure on these customary processes and risks undoing these negotiations.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Doré, Mohamed D. 2024. "Décret : le nouveau code pastoral de la Guinée promulgué." GuinéeNews. <https://guineenews.org/decret-le-nouveau-code-pastoral-de-la-guinee-promulque/>.

⁹⁷ Doré 2024

⁹⁸ USAID Land Tenure, n.d.

⁹⁹ Touré 2004

3.2 Informal and Customary Community Management Approaches

As is typical across West Africa, and therefore relevant in the research locations, local chiefs and elders play crucial roles in managing community issues, often bridging the gap between the state and the local population. These traditional leaders are instrumental in mediating conflicts, especially those related to land and transhumance. Religious leaders, along with opinion leaders within the communities, contribute significantly to governance by promoting social cohesion and mediating in disputes. Their influence is profound in areas where formal government presence is minimal or less effective. Meanwhile, local government officials are tasked with overseeing development projects and implementing national policies. However, the effectiveness of these officials can be hampered by limited resources and alleged corruption, which may exacerbate local grievances.

In Guinea, the village chief, known as the “Douti” in Maninka Kan, is an elected position within the community, whereas the village patriarch, known as the “Soti”, inherits his role through a hereditary order of succession. In most locations of the research, the Soti had the more prominent and respected role in the community, and was able to facilitate land grants, but not actually designate them. These traditional leaders are also generally brought in to mediate disputes before they escalate into violence. For example, the research found that across both regions, respondents reported that local chiefs settle disputes over land use and livestock grazing rights, acting as crucial intermediaries between the state and local communities. The local chiefs also host regular community meetings to discuss local governance issues, allowing community members to voice their concerns and participate in decision-making processes.

Guinea’s current government, the CNRD, sought to consolidate its power throughout the country by replacing traditional authorities with supporters of the regime after it came to power in 2021. This initially created tensions at the local level, as the people themselves had no input into the choices for local and traditional leadership. As a traditional leader from the Lola Prefecture (N’Zérékoré Region) explained, *“the replacement of mayors by special delegations is highly contested in some places because the people feel that the delegations are closer to the government and were chosen to allow the CNRD to remain in power. This distorts relations between citizens and local officials... in some localities the population is calling for the new authorities to leave.”* Nonetheless, there appears to be some level of acceptance of these local authorities, as most leaders were selected from among the local community, instead of representatives from the capital.¹⁰⁰ And as a civil society leader also in Lola Prefecture explained, *“the replacement of our traditional leaders was imposed by the military regime without the opinion of the people, but as they are sons of the region, the people have accepted it.”*

¹⁰⁰ Several expert interviews confirmed that the politicized process is still accepted locally to some extent because these people are local.

Box 3: Ruling Families and Questions of Indigeneity

Familial (dynastic) legacy has significant influence over governance in local communities, and often is a determinant of how issues are mediated. In many customary or traditional community governance structures, dynastic legacies govern local dynamics and politics. For example, respondents in the Sanankoroni commune spoke of how important big family power dynamics were in influencing and mediating political and intercommunal issues, and, as one woman explained, “*it is these large families who make the big decisions for the community.*”¹⁰¹

However, respondents explained that the big families — and thus the majority of local communal governance — administer governance and rule of law only over the sedentary population. In fact, most respondents referred to locals as ‘natives’ or indigenous’ people, highlighting a precedent that clearly differentiates between them and migrants, especially transhumant pastoralists. This becomes problematic with regards to determining land rights, ownership, and access, a sensitive issue as herders seek to maintain positive relations with local landowners, or ‘indigenous’ populations.¹⁰² Indigeneity is a significant causal factor in farmer-herder conflicts, and, as such, governments in Ghana and Nigeria have instituted laws to address these conflict drivers, though not necessarily with success.¹⁰³

Thus, herders that were interviewed for the research acknowledged that the familial governance structures that are aligned with questions of indigeneity have significant representation in Guinea. The conflict management office in each commune is the only entity that exists in Guinea that provides representation and legal accountability for herders, whereas other customary and technical structures only exist for the benefit of the local population. The nuances of the indigeneity question were reinforced by one respondent from Lainé, who explained that the other governance structures only serve “*native speakers.*”

However, community cohesion was granted to migrant groups that stay and become localized in some cases. For example, a focus group in Sanankoroni explained that these longer term and permanent ‘*foreigners*’ will adopt local policies, intermingle, and eventually earn the opportunity to nominate a representative from their group to the conflict office.

Local conflict resolution mechanisms most often involve dialogue and mediation between the two parties to the conflict or dispute, facilitated by elders and traditional leaders, which are valued for their accessibility and cultural relevance. Often, community members are welcomed to participate and help set the agenda of discussion, and then decisions are typically made by a vote or consensus. If mediation does not result in a collectively agreed upon way forward or

¹⁰¹ Female civil society participant in a focus group in Sanankoroni, Kankan Region, Guinea, April 2024

¹⁰² Pellerin and Réseau Billital Marobé (RBM) 2021, pg. 32

¹⁰³ Onwuzuruigbo, Ifeanyi. 2023. “Citizenship, Indigeneity and the Management of Herders and Farmers Conflicts in Ghana and Nigeria.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 29 (3): 352-370.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2023.2211448>.

resolution, or if it requires more senior leadership to weigh in, the dispute will be reported to the sub-prefecture or mayor who then makes an administrative decision or issues an order to implement said decision; as outlined in the following sub-section, Guinea has made efforts to establish a peace framework at each local level, to address these types of community issues. Participants in these mediation efforts include communal or civil society organizations (CSOs) (e.g. women and youth associations, community associations like 'Wassolon Demen', and farming or herding collectives) that represent the parties to the conflict.

However, the research sample was split on how effective these grassroots mediation efforts are at representing their groups' interests. Some respondents said that these community organizations include sufficient representation of their groups. As one young civil society leader from Beyla-center explained, *"they are more or less staffed to effectively represent the local population, because they regularly provide training related to conflict management and resolution."* However, other respondents reported that the people who led these organizations were not well qualified to do so, which is encapsulated in the commentary by a religious leader from Foumabdou, who said that *"currently there are some shortcomings in their way of representing the local population. For me, there is a need to equip them through capacity building so that they are well staffed to effectively represent the local population."*

Law enforcement becomes involved if property or physical damage occurs. According to a local official from Sanankoro, *"When there are decisions to be made in the community, it depends if, for example, it is a problem which requires the involvement of the police or the gendarmerie, it is the gendarmerie which decides. If it is a family matter, generally it is the wise people who decide. And if it is a problem that concerns the entire community, the municipality brings together the leaders of each group (women, elders, young people, etc.) to decide."*

However, how issues are discussed and mediated differs by community and topic of issue. For example, the religious chief of Morodou explained that in his community, the inputs from administrative officials are only brought in at the last minute, and it is usually done to ensure these decisions are acknowledged and accepted by national authorities and to avoid any misreading of laws. Meanwhile, other community members provided details about how high level authorities weigh in only when successive conflict resolution attempts at the local level have already failed. Furthermore, while formal legal mechanisms exist, their reach and effectiveness can be limited, especially in remote areas. Several respondents mentioned local initiatives aimed at building peace, such as the formation of conflict management committees or 'Kèlèban Ton', that include members from different ethnic and occupational backgrounds who are tasked with the responsibility of mitigating and then mediating conflicts when they emerge. These peace committees are now being integrated in Guinea's national policy, as discussed in the following subsection.

3.3 Integrating Customary Practices into Guinea's Peace Architecture

Guinea's legal frameworks mandate that local conflict management committees address disputes and conflicts when they arise first. The Pastoral Land Code specifically requires that parties to the conflict attempt reconciliation efforts through these committees before escalating the dispute to official channels for legal litigation. However, as mentioned previously, these legal frameworks — both the 2001 and 2024 codes — have been largely deemed ineffective due to lack of capacity to enforce these laws.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, the UN Development Programme (UNDP),¹⁰⁵ West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), and Search for Common Ground have carried out several capacity building efforts across Guinea's **Social Infrastructure for Peace (or Infrastructures Sociales de Paix in French, ISP)**.¹⁰⁶ These instruments, described in more detail below, play a crucial role in implementing conflict prevention programs and strengthening social cohesion within local communities. Most of these capacity building programs have targeted communes in the N'Zérékoré Region.

The 'Kèlèban Ton', or 'conflict management committees', were highlighted by many respondents during the data collection period as a preferred local instrument for mediating and mitigating inter- and intra-communal conflicts. These are local initiatives set up by the community composed of local appointees that often includes the traditional leaders like the Douti and Soti. It is noteworthy that there is often little, if any, representation given to people who are not permanent residents, nor indigenous, to the town (see Box 3 for more details on indigeneity conflicts).

The 'Kèlèban Ton' are engaged usually early, after negotiations between parties to the conflict have failed to identify a solution, such as reparations or damages to be paid, or if the mediation requires input from more senior government officials or law enforcement. As a livestock breeder from Niantanina, Mandiana Prefecture (Kankan Region) explained, *"If [a conflict] is between farmers and breeders, we go through the Douti or Soti who calls both parties for explanations. If it is necessary to ask for forgiveness to resolve it we do so; but if it exceeds that then that's when the Douti or Soti calls the Kèlèban Ton to assess the damage in order to reimburse the farmer."*

In some places, the committee's capacity to mediate conflicts extends beyond the village or commune, as was the case in Niantanina, where there is a communal level committee referred to locally as the Wassolon Kèlèban Ton, that has broader municipal level governing authority

¹⁰⁴ Almost all respondents to the data collection reported that these codes are ineffective, but also recommended that enforcement of these policies and codes could help mitigate intercommunal conflicts.


¹⁰⁵ With support from UNDP's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), ISPs were identified and integrated into communal synergies across fifty at-risk communes in the N'Zérékoré Region.

¹⁰⁶ Morel, Justin. 2021. "Guinée: l'atelier de réflexion et de conception de l'Architecture Nationale de Paix." GuineaConakry.online.

<https://guineeconakry.online/2021/12/07/guinee-latelier-de-reflexion-et-de-conception-de-larchitecture-nationale-de-paix/>.

with the capacity to intervene beyond the boundaries of a village.¹⁰⁷ Collectively, these committees comprise the most local and grassroots level of Guinea’s national architecture of peace actors, or ISP.

Image 6: By location, Respondent awareness of local mediators or peace committees



Source: Data collection


The Communal Synergies for Peace (known in French as the Synergie Communales des Acteurs pour la Paix, or SyCAP) is a social cohesion initiative that convenes across communes to consolidate peace in Guinea in response to a long history of tension and conflict. Established in 2015, SyCAPs operate at the communal level and serve as a cross-communal instrument that promotes collaboration among various local peace committees (Kèlèban Ton), by supporting inter-communal dialogue, mediation, and conflict prevention. SyCAPs are led by local leaders responsible for coordinating peace efforts and managing community development initiatives. They are currently active primarily in the N’Zérékoré Region, where the UN has carried out several capacity building programs with these organizations. Each SyCAP consists of 15 members representing various community groups, including elders, traditional chiefs, religious councils, women's groups, youth groups, CSOs, and representatives from defense and security forces.

The Prefectoral Synergies for Peace (known in French as the Synergies Préfectorales des Acteurs de Paix, or SyPAP) convenes SyCAPs at the prefectoral level, under the Ministry of Citizenship and National Unity national peace architecture plan. The SyPAPs help synergize the various communal level efforts at the prefectoral level and manage conflicts that require more senior level support from national level government officials. The SyPAP consists of nine members, including representatives from religious councils, administrative authorities (including political appointees), CSOs, women's associations, youth groups, and local consultation committees particularly from mining areas, where the Guinean government has expressed significant interest in ensuring peace.

¹⁰⁷ Search For Common Ground. 2022. “Rapport d’Evaluation Finale et Enquete de Perception Project Fonike, Entrepreneurs Sociaux pour la Paix en Guinee.” UN Peacebuilding. https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf_irf-327_evaluation_finale_projet_fonike_-_version_finale_du_rapport_revuespbf.pdf.

At the regional level sits the **Regional Synergies for Peace (known in French as the Synergie Régionale des Acteurs de Paix in French, or SyRAP)**. The SyRAPs of the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions are composed of key regional figures to include the governor of the administrative region, regional advisors on good governance, representatives from religious councils, CSOs, youth groups, and women's groups. The SyRAP coordinates peace efforts across the region and ensures that peace initiatives are effectively implemented.

Image 7: Guinea's Social Infrastructure for Peace




These synergy committees across the communal, prefectoral and regional administrative levels, operate in partnership with the Ministry of Citizenship and National Unity. Their role in Guinea is to facilitate dialogue that aims to prevent violent conflicts and promote peaceful solutions. If dispute resolution efforts fail at local levels, they are pushed up the ladder to the higher administrative levels to receive more tactical attention and support. Depending on their capacity, communal entities may also offer training and resources to enhance conflict management skills among synergy members. As a nexus between communal actors and NGOs, these synergy committees collaborate with various organizations and institutions, such as UNDP and WANEP, operating as a conduit for NGOs to use for interventions. Recently, under Search for Common Ground and UNDP, the entire ISP framework received funding to synergize the regional committees to create an early warning system coordinated with the Ministries.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Ouattara, Gustave. 2023. "Rapport final d'évaluation finale indépendante: Projet d'Appui à la participation des jeunes à la prévention des conflits en période électorale et la pérennisation des Synergies locales des acteurs de paix

3.4 Local Literacy of Existing Conflict Management Tools

Image 8: Respondents who were aware of conflict resolution laws and processes



Source: Data collection

Local awareness of the available legal and social tools (described in subsection 3.1) for people to leverage to mediate conflicts, was high in both the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions. Over 60% of the research sample was aware of the implications and regulations prescribed in the legal frameworks that govern pastoralism, resource usage, and rural land access; however, the majority of people still cite these legal frameworks incorrectly, showcasing low literacy of the actual laws and their application.¹⁰⁹ As previously mentioned, local conflict management committees are instrumental in mitigating and mediating conflicts at the commune and prefectorial level in Guinea. Additionally, there are women's associations, but women are still largely unrepresented in conflict management committees, according to UNOWAS.¹¹⁰ Most communities in Guinea have local and traditional initiatives to manage community conflicts that can be adapted into the national peace framework, ISP. For example, the "Fasso Kani" in Saladou and the "Benkadi" in Sanankoroni are local customary approaches to peace committees, like the Kèlèban Ton, tasked with managing intercommunal conflicts. Most of these initiatives have already been incorporated into the ISP, as 40% of the research sample reported having participated in NGO-led social cohesion programs funded by international donors, that aim to bolster capacity of these local and prefectorial level initiatives.

In general though, most conflicts tend to be managed between civilians, before mediation is required from administrative authorities or the peace committees. In general, the respondents acknowledged that the best solutions emerge when two parties to the conflict can address their issues between them, without escalating it to include other mediators. As a youth civil society leader from Beyla explained, "*when there are conflicts, we try to find compromises*

de Guinée." UNDP and Search for Common Ground.

https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/rapport_final_evaluation_finale_projet_isp_vf.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ Statistics regarding legal awareness typically favor men, who have the opportunity to learn about these laws outside of the household more easily than women do, due to traditional gender norms that prohibit women from participating in public activities. This study found that only 57% of women were familiar with these laws, while 66% of men were aware of the existing laws. Almost 90% of the research samples in Niantanina and Saladou (Kankan Region) were familiar with both national and customary legal frameworks, whereas less than a third of the research sample in Foubadou and Lainé (N'Zérékoré Region), knew of these laws.

¹¹⁰ UNOWAS Research and Analysis Unit 2018

between farmers and breeders while respecting the agricultural calendar and the transhumance periods.”

However, adhering to agricultural trends and customary practices has been difficult in recent years due to the issues mentioned Part 2, and the government has been pulled into police herders more often, and strictly enforce farming and herding seasons. As explained by a herder from Beyla, *“since the State became involved in the resolution of conflicts by demanding respect for the agricultural calendar, neighboring regions have found an alternative of 6 months of wandering of animals in the dry season and 6 months of cultivation for farmers in the rainy season.”* A female civil society leader in Fonodou also explained that their community levies fines on herders who allow their livestock to roam freely, destroying crops and private property. According to a state official in Morodou, these fines can amount to 200,000 Guinean Franc (Gnf, which is approximately \$23.27 U.S. Dollars) for each stray oxen or donkey and 150,000 Gnf (approximately \$17.45) per sheep.

In response to the cyclical nature of farmer herder conflicts, some groups are actively adapting their socio-economic activities to better manage resources and reduce the potential triggers and drivers of conflict. Respondents spoke of imposing regulations on grazing practices and mandating animal supervision, including building enclosures and pens for livestock when they are not grazing. Farmers are building fences around their property, so that grazing livestock would be deterred from destroying crops. Additionally, both farmer and herder KIs and focus group participants shared information about newly established joint initiatives these groups are undertaking together to support agro-pastoral cohesion. Some communities are building boreholes located some distance from farms, in order to draw animals away from croplands, to avoid crop destruction. In other examples, farmers are supporting herders, in planting foraging plants that are adaptable in all seasons, for livestock to consume.

Nonetheless, some farming communities, particularly in the N’Zérékoré Region, were unmoved by solutions to mediate tensions, viewing herders as foreigners that were stealing their resources and their lands. In these contexts, the question of indigeneity appears to emerge as the primary driver of conflict between farmers and herders.

Conclusion

Pastoralism and livestock rearing is a critical livelihood in West Africa, and one of the biggest industries in Guinea. The literature assesses that transhumant pastoralism is probably the most resilient socio-economic sector in West Africa, as it is highly adapted to the semi-arid lands of the Sahel and Sudano-Sahel savannas. Moreover, unlike farming, pastoralists rely heavily on sustainable resource management and use, due to the limited resources they have available while moving from place to place.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, most farmers in rural West Africa participate in corrosive farming tactics, including uncontrollable slash and burn practices, that are often not carried out effectively. As such, although we found that there might have only been a moderate increase in farmer-herder clashes in the past year, concerns about escalating intercommunal violence are widespread among the respondent pool of this research study. A crisis of confidence has set in with the communities in the Kankan and N'Zérékoré regions, which appears to be based on a few factors.

First, the political dynamics in Guinea have heavily impacted confidence and respect for the legitimacy of local and national authorities. Customary authorities have always played an incredibly important and outsized role in influencing local politics in Guinea. However, under the CNRD, many customary and traditional leaders have been replaced by pro-regime actors. Even though, as mentioned, these leaders are still local and generally accepted by the local population, the research found that the undoing of centuries of tradition has also eroded legitimacy in customary conflict resolution practices. This creates risks that latent and unresolved conflicts could become inflamed at a later time.

Second, economic insecurity in West Africa is high, which has always been an indicator of fragility. However, in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic downturn that followed, the livelihoods of at-risk groups are facing even more vulnerabilities now, following years of protracted conflicts in the Sahel which have created a refugee and displacement crisis. KIIIs reported their concerns about the growing presence of foreigners in their communities in the past year, and the pressures this puts on local resources and community dynamics. Concerns are growing that displaced people fleeing socio-economic, political and VEO linked issues in the Sahel could import these stressors into Guinea. As a result, antagonism towards foreigners is growing, igniting indigeneity tensions and intercommunal violence.

Finally, these two issues become amplified by fears that violent extremism is expanding into Guinea. The perception of VEO presence - and the suspicion communities cast on non-locals - is creating a tense environment in borderland communities that is breaking down traditional community dynamics, and fueling inter- and intra-communal violence.¹¹² Violent extremism in Guinea is viewed as a foreign concept that is being imported in by Malians and others, so local Guineans are prone to cast blame on foreigners, migrants (like pastoralists and traders), and

¹¹¹ Richards 2024

¹¹² See multiple studies on JNIM's recruitment in Coastal West Africa, including, Bernard and Mossi 2023 and Nsaibia 2023

displaced people as being the conduits through which violent extremism enters their community. While VEOs are also often violent actors themselves, the fear that precipitates their presence is a significant driver of communal violence.

The recommendations in the following section are an assessment of findings and takeaways from the data collection and the literature. While many respondents found that the tactics and actions of security forces is generally problematic, most people still view the government and their security as the proper actors to manage communal level disputes and conflicts. This speaks to the need to reinforce government institutions and to activate the laws that do exist about enforcing pastoral and land rights codes. Because, in the absence of a functioning state and a rules-based society that governs daily life, access to resources, and adjudicating damages, social interactions will devolve into conflicts.

Recommendations

1. Target support towards existing ISP structures and avoid reinventing new peace committees. Guinea has a remarkable presence of institutions across the local and national levels that weave into the broader peace architecture. There is no need to create more; but, what each institution needs is more resources. It's noteworthy that NGO-led efforts typically focus on education or awareness raising, instead of resourcing these initiatives with more technical and logistical support, which often is one of the greatest shortcomings of these committees. Moreover, most work to date has been done in the N'Zérékoré Region, leaving areas in other parts of Guinea lacking NGO support.

Recommendation 1.1: Provide resources and training, strengthening these formal and informal mechanisms for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts between farmers and herders with a goal of making them more effective and inclusive in mediation within communities. In Gbessoba and Saladou in particular, respondents pointed to the interventions by NGOs, including training about peace and conflict resolution, that have resulted in sustainable means to mitigate intra- and inter-communal violence, showcasing success stories of NGO interventions. However, more resources are needed, particularly with regards to logistical support to maintain these committees.

Recommendation 1.2: Ensure equal representation from groups that are party to conflicts. This means that with any committee tasked with managing farmer-herder conflicts, that there is equal representation of both farmers and herders. The problem in Guinea, was that most committees are composed of the local 'indigenous' population, which often marginalized representation of pastoralists that are not local to the community. This has the effect of conflict resolution processes favoring the local population through inherent biases they might have against non-local actors. This should be addressed through diversity nominations that are inclusive, and sensitizing people about biases and ethnocentrism.

Recommendation 1.3: Raise awareness about land and pastoral laws using community tools such as social media, theater, round tables, and mobile cinemas. Ensure that issues regarding transhumance are included in the commune level's strategic plans, such as the Plan Development Local or the Plan d'Aménagement et d'Investissement. This will also help to reduce inequalities, not by developing new policies, but by helping collective adherence to existing policies, so that people can understand how to navigate these laws, and avoid running afoul of existing policies that might lead to conflicts.

Recommendation 1.4: Specifically include youth, women and marginalized ethnic or sub-groups. Guinea's peace infrastructure has all the right tools, except it lacks diversity. There is a critical need to include more at-risk groups, such as women, youth, and other migrant or minority groups that are not well represented in these peace structures, particularly with the community level committees like the Kèlèban Ton.

2. Build information pipelines and feedback loops. By leveraging the existing peace infrastructure in Guinea, NGO's and partners can pump information into these systems to help promote inclusive and participatory frameworks to address important national issues. These frameworks must be spaces for free expression where all participants' opinions are respected regardless of their view.

Recommendation 2.1: Make information more easily accessible. This can be done through radio, Whatsapp, and town halls - any platform - to share information about upcoming political engagements and changes, new laws and legal reforms, and information about insecurity that might bring more security forces to a community. By hosting these information seminars, NGOs or the government will help to depoliticize social conflicts by promoting peacefully living together and initiatives in favor of this. These 'sensitization' efforts can also be leveraged to help reduce space for VEOs to recruit or intercommunal conflict to emerge, by debunking mis/dis-informed narratives and hate speech to reduce the trend towards negative rhetoric escalating into violence.

Recommendation 2.2: Address the unresolved traumas of Guinea's long conflict history, by building a common history together to promote community cohesion. This can be done by first creating and/or hosting town halls and community engagement spaces for inter-ethnic reflection on how various groups caused trauma, and addressing that trauma in group dialogue, storytelling and even forgiveness ceremonies. In these same spaces, dialogues should focus on deconstructing prejudices and intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic stereotypes that affect living together.

3. Increase security capabilities through better training, sensitization, and resourcing. This recommendation is focused on more institution building, targeting the Government of Guinea, as it goes beyond the capacity of NGO programming, but is critical in order to ensure that community-driven activities are sustained, especially as external violent actors emerge in Guinea.

Recommendation 3.1: Increase the number of border agents, and also build or reinforce existing border infrastructure. Guinea's porous borders represent significant vulnerabilities the state faces with regards to VEO and serious organized crime threats from the Sahel and broadly across the West African sub-region. By reinforcing border capacity,

crime and violent extremist threats can be interdicted more capably. However, there is also a critical need to equip border security with training to help facilitate access to information for transhumant herders in the countries, to avoid penalizing groups that move across borders both formally and informally. It's not only criminals and VEOs that are using 'unapproved routes' to cross borders, so blanket border bans often hurt locals. Guinea should take a more nuanced approach to border security, collaborating with trade representatives.

Recommendation 3.2: Formalizing the customary agreements borderland communities have about mobility and trade, that often predate the drawing of post-colonial borders. Many communities follow informal trade patterns, such that their livelihoods rely heavily on undisrupted trade and cross-border movement. Hardening of borders under counterterrorism policies, however, have disrupted the livelihoods of these very fragile ecosystems within borderland communities, creating more vulnerabilities, which armed groups often exploit. Therefore border security should attempt to address, formalize and incorporate awareness of these cross-border arrangements between communities living along borders, into their border policy. Through these processes, seasonal differences will be taken into account and will promote cross-border collaboration and communication pipelines between the civilian populations and security.

4. Include conservation and environmental protections in community cohesion activities in order to ensure, from the beginning, that these resource management practices are part of all community practices.

Recommendation 4.1: Promote environmental sustainability and biodiversity protective practices. For instance, provide farmers with fast-growing crops to counteract seasonal overlaps, which often leads to conflicts. Additionally, supply breeders with barbed wire fences for livestock containment during guarding periods. Support farmers in creating income-generating opportunities, particularly aimed at encouraging agriculture among young individuals and women. These initiatives require collective action by farmers and herders to work together and collaborate, and, more importantly, to remain transparent and impartial when mitigating conflicts.

Recommendation 4.2: Introduce technology, such as GPS tracking for livestock and improved agricultural practices. This can help reduce the overlap of farming and grazing areas. Innovations in water management, such as rainwater harvesting and the creation of water reservoirs, could alleviate some of the pressures that lead to conflicts.

Annex: Transhumance Gates and Markets

Region	Prefecture	Sub-Prefecture	Name	Type	Latitude	Longitude
Kankan	Kankan	Boula	Boula	gate	9.7745	-8.4916
Kankan	Mandiana	Saladou	Tindila	market	10.26326	-8.24664
Kankan	Mandiana	Saladou	Lensoron	gate	10.491735	-8.291459
Kankan	Mandiana	Saladou	Kantoumanina	market	10.47901	-8.66171
Kankan	Mandiana	Saladou	Wahiry	gate	10.27267	-8.13821
Kankan	Mandiana	Saladou	Gnako	market	10.335873	-8.563419
Kankan	Kankan	Kankan	Kankan	market	10.3835	-9.3069
Kankan	Mandiana	Mandiana	Mandiana	market	10.62211	-8.69495
Kankan	Mandiana	Faralako	Malikila	gate	11.0361	-8.21549
Kankan	Mandiana	Faralako	Faralako	gate	10.66772	-8.70033
Kankan	Mandiana	Kondianakoro	Dounoukolo	gate	11.06461	-8.64239
Kankan	Mandiana	Niantanina	Tonkolomba	gate	10.988963	-8.303112
Kankan	Mandiana	Dialakoro	Kantedou-Balandou	gate	11.582251	-8.746783
Kankan	Siguiri	Siguiri	Siguiri	market	11.4195	-9.1752
Kankan	Mandiana	Balandougouba	Niani	gate	11.37869	-8.38636
Kankan	Mandiana	Balandougouba	Bougou	gate	11.30919	-8.3718
Kankan	Mandiana	Balandougouba	Sidikila	gate	11.23937	-8.49184
Kankan	Mandiana	Kinieran	Kinieran	market	11.07842	-8.83299
Kankan	Kérouané	Kérouané	Kérouané centre	market	9.27057	-9.00762
Kankan	Kérouané	Soromaya	Maka Férédou	market	9.371667	-9.598056
Kankan	Kérouané	Banankoro	Banankoro	market	9.17975	-9.29979
Kankan	Kérouané	Falando	Falando	market	9.01882	-9.44537
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Soumaïlasso	gate	8.455694	-7.68449
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Fandou Koro	gate	8.528447	-7.906874
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Madina Koro	gate	8.520873	-7.686766
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Fonodou	gate	8.540178	-7.835017
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Koumandou	Sagnala	gate	9.124742	-8.086331
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Koumandou	Togobala	gate	9.27789	-7.965231
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Koumandou	Famorodou	gate	9.146544	-7.851318
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Koumandou	Sirana	gate	9.379965	-7.871955
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Blassana	gate	8.93333	-7.96667
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Worosounkoro	gate	8.764252	-7.929435
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Blangba	market	8.690159	-7.982285
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Vasséso	gate	8.783147	-7.95193

Region	Prefecture	Sub-Prefecture	Name	Type	Latitude	Longitude
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Gbèssoba	Tinkoro	gate	8.8314	-7.99373
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Karala	Kobala	gate	9.240889	-8.577268
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Sokourala	Tanantou	gate	9.280168	-8.04136
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Sokourala	Heremakono	gate	9.364552	-8.110766
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Sokourala	Dakourala	gate	9.427479	-8.07769
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Sokourala	Kemosso	gate	9.053264	-7.865112
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Diaraguéréla	Dougblèla	gate	8.52161	-8.26389
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Boola	Boola	market	8.35836	-8.71579
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Beyla	Beyla	market	8.68985	-8.64835
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Fouala	Fouala	market	8.97455	-8.33115
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Diassodou	Diassodou	market	9.11147	-8.33986
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Samana	Samana	market	9.11413	-8.55681
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Nionsomoridou	Nionsomoridou	market	8.722	-8.8381
N'Zérékoré	Beyla	Sinko	Sinko	market	8.8787	-8.27082
N'Zérékoré	Lola	Foumbadou	Foumbadou	gate	8.1903	-8.41298
N'Zérékoré	Lola	Foumbadou	Foumbadou	market	8.1903	-8.41298
N'Zérékoré	Lola	Guéasso	Guéasso	gate	8.026	-8.2333
N'Zérékoré	Lola	Guéasso	Guéasso	market	8.026	-8.2333
N'Zérékoré	Lola	Lola	Lainé	market	8.07378	-8.47945

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